Weaponizing Winter: Energy Infrastructure, Coercive Strategy, and Civilian Vulnerability in the Russia-Ukraine War

Abstract

In the Russia-Ukraine war, energy infrastructure has emerged as a prominent arena for coercion, civilian security and resilience, and has been the target of repeated Russian attacks against Ukraine. This Article discusses the different types of seasonally concentrated attacks and clarifies the strategic aim behind them and their impact on IHL at stake if there are attacks on interconnected energy systems that leave civilians affected. The study utilises a qualitative approach using an embedded single-case design from February 2022 to 31 August 2026, combining peer-reviewed scholarship with the official documentation of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission (UHR) in Ukraine, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Criminal Court, and the ICRC treaty database. Three embedded sub-units are analysed (attacks on electricity and heating power stations in Ukraine, nuclear safety and legal issues at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil power stations). The results show that the line of reasoning about Ukraine's energy system is a punishment/attrition/leverage line instead of capitulation. Official reporting reveals that attacks against power and heating systems enhance civilian impact, particularly during the winter season. The study establishes that the term “dual-use” should not substitute the Article 52 military objective test and that Article 56 precautions should be more specifically considered for nuclear facilities. It concludes that direct comparison of Russian and Ukrainian energy-targeting campaigns is challenging due to differing targets, civilian exposure, and assessment standards. Strategic and IHL assessments are strongest when viewed cumulatively rather than as substitutes for strike-specific legal analysis.